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Supreme Court Case List - Upcoming Arguments and Arguments Not Yet Scheduled
 

Supreme Court Case List

Upcoming Arguments and Arguments Not Yet Scheduled

Below are listed upcoming Supreme Court cases. Cases scheduled for oral argument, and cases not yet scheduled are presented in separate lists.

Click on the Case Title for further details. Oral argument recordings, if available, may be heard or paused by clicking on the respective play or pause button next to the argument date. Oral argument transcripts may be in either PDF or text format. Link to them by clicking on the or images respectively. PDF documents for available opinions can be viewed by clicking on the image.

The cases listed below have not yet been scheduled for argument.

33 Upcoming Cases Before the United States Supreme Court, Not Yet Scheduled for Argument
#Case TitleDocket No.CertiorariQuestions to be PresentedTerm
1Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt14-11752015-06-301. Whether the federal discretionary-function immunity rule, 28 U.S.C. $2680(a), is categorically inapplicable to intentional torts and bad-faith conduct. 2. Whether Nevada may refuse to extend to sister States haled into Nevada courts the same immunities Nevada enjoys in those courts. 3. Whether Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), which permits a sovereign State to be haled into the courts of another State without its consent, should be overruled.2015
2Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association14-9152015-06-301. Whether Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), should be overruled and public-sector "agency shop" arrangements invalidated under the First Amendment. 2. Whether it violates the First Amendment to require that public employees affirmatively object to subsidizing nonchargeable speech by public-sector unions, rather than requiring that employees affirmatively consent to subsidizing such speech.2015
3Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States14-5102015-06-30Whether the D.C. Circuit misapplied this Court's Holland decision when it ruled - in direct conflict with a holding of the Federal Circuit on materially similar facts - that the Tribe did not face an "extraordinary circumstance" warranting equitable tolling of the statute of limitations for filing of Indian Self-Determination Act claims under the Contract Disputes Act?2015
4Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Manning14-11322015-06-30Whether Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 provides federal jurisdiction over state-Iaw claims seeking to establish liability based on violations of the Act or its regulations or seeking to enforce duties created by the Act or its regulations.2015
5FISHER v. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN14-9812015-06-29Whether the Fifth Circuit's re-endorsement of the University of Texas at Austin's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions decisions can be sustained under this Court's decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, including Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).2015
6GOBEILLE v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE14-1812015-06-29Did the Second Circuit - in a 2-1 panel decision that disregarded the considered opinion advanced by the United States as amicus -err in holding that ERISA preempts Vermont's health care database law as applied to the third-party administrator for a self-funded ERISA plan?2015
7TORRES v. HOLDER14-10962015-06-29Whether a state offense constitutes an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. $ 1101(a)(43), on the ground that the state offense is "described in" a specified federal statute, where the federal statute includes an interstate commerce element that the state offense lacks.2015
8MUSACCHIO v. UNITED STATES14-10952015-06-291. Whether the law-of-the-case doctrine requires the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case to be measured against the elements described in the jury instructions where those instructions, without objection, require the government to prove additional or more stringent elements than do the statute and indictment? 2. Whether a statute-of-limitations defense not raised at or before trial is reviewable on appeal?2015
9KINGDOMWARE TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. UNITED STATES14-9162015-06-22Whether the Federal Circuit erred in construing 38 U.S.C. 8127(d)'s mandatory set-aside restricting competition for Department of Veterans Affairs' contracts to veteran-owned small businesses as discretionary.2015
10Dollar General Corporation v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians13-14962015-06-15Whether Indian tribal courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate civil tort claims against nonmembers, including as a means of regulating the conduct of nonmembers who enter into consensual relationships with a tribe or its members?2015
11BRUCE v. SAMUELS14-8442015-06-15When a prisoner files more than one case or appeal in the federal courts in forma pauperis, does Section 1915(b)(2) cap the monthly exaction of filing fees at 20% of the prisoner's monthly income regardless of the number of cases or appeals for which he owes filing fees?2015
12LUIS v. UNITED STATES14-4192015-06-08This case presents an opportunity for the Court to resolve a circuit split on a question of fundamental importance to the adversarial system of justice: whether the restraint of untainted assets needed to retain counsel of choice in a criminal case violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Last Term, this Court reaffirmed that tainted assets may be restrained pre-trial (and forfeited upon conviction), even when those assets are needed to retain counsel of choice. Kaley v. United States, _ U.S. _, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1105 (2014); accord United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 616 (1989); Caplin & Drysdale, Chtd. v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 631 (1989). In rejecting constitutional challenges to pretrial restraints under 21 U.S.C. 853, it was significant to this Court that the restrained assets were tainted, i.e., traceable to the alleged criminal conduct. See, e.g., Kaley, 134 S. Ct. at 1095 (noting that "no one contests that the assets in question derive from, or were used in committing, the offenses"). Although the Solicitor General and three Justices appeared to agree that the restraint of untainted assets would pose constitutional problems, see id. at 1095 n.3; id. at 1108 & n.2 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting), the majority opinion in Kaley "[did] not opine on the matter." Kaley, 134 S. Ct. at 1095 n.3. The Fourth Circuit has expressly held that "[w]hile Caplin [& Drysdale, Chtd.] made absolutely clear that there is no Sixth Amendment right for a defendant to obtain counsel using tainted funds, [a defendant] still possesses a qualified Sixth Amendment right to use wholly legitimate funds to hire the attorney of his choice." United States v. Farmer, 274 F.3d 800, 804 (4th Cir. 2001). Addressing a pretrial restraint under 18 U.S.C. 1345, the Eleventh Circuit in this case upheld a preliminary injunction that currently restrains all of petitioner's assets, including undisputedly untainted funds needed by her to engage private counsel in her criminal case. Ignoring the Fourth Circuit's holding in Farmer and the important and historical distinction between tainted and untainted assets, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted Kaley, Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale, Chtd. to "foreclose" petitioner's constitutional challenge to the pretrial restraint of legitimate, untainted funds she needs to retain counsel of choice. United States v. Luis, No. 13-13719, 564 F. App'x. 493, 494 (11th Cir. 2014). Given the conflict between the circuits on a constitutional issue significant to criminal defendants, the criminal defense bar and the administration of justice, this petition presents the following question for certiorari review: Whether the pretrial restraint of a criminal defendant's legitimate, untainted assets (those not traceable to a criminal offense) needed to retain counsel of choice violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. CERT. GRANTED 6/8/2015 2015
13SHAPIRO v. MACK14-9902015-06-08May a single-judge district court determine that a complaint covered by 28 U.S.C. 2284 is insubstantial, and that three judges therefore are not required, not because it concludes that the complaint is wholly frivolous, but because it concludes that the complaint fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)?2015
14TYSON FOODS, INC. v. BOUAPHAKEO14-11462015-06-08I. Whether differences among individual class members may be ignored and a class action certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), or a collective action certified under the Fair Labor Standards Act, where liability and damages will be determined with statistical techniques that presume all class members are identical to the average observed in a sample. II. Whether a class action may be certified or maintained under Rule 23(b)(3), or a collective action certified or maintained under the Fair Labor Standards Act, when the class contains hundreds of members who were not injured and have no legal right to any damages.2015
15FOSTER v. HUMPHREY14-83492015-05-26In this capital case involving a black defendant and a white victim, Georgia struck all four black prospective jurors and provided roughly a dozen "race-neutral" reasons for each of the four strikes. The prosecutor later argued that the jury should impose a death sentence to "deter other people out there in the projects." At the trial level and on direct appeal, Georgia's courts denied the defendant's claim of race discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky, 4 76 U.S. 79 (1986). In habeas proceedings, the defendant obtained the prosecution's notes from jury selection, which were previously withheld. The notes reflect that the prosecution (1) marked the name of each black prospective juror in green highlighter on four different copies of the jury list; (2) circled the word "BLACK'' next to the "Race" question on the juror questionnaires of five black prospective jurors; (3) identified three black prospective jurors as "B#1," "B#2," and "B#3"; (4) ranked the black prospective jurors against each other in case "it comes down to having to pick one of the black jurors;" and (5) created strike lists that contradict the "race-neutral" explanation provided by the prosecution for its strike of one of the black prospective jurors. The Georgia courts again declined to find a Batson violation. The question presented is this: Did the Georgia courts err in failing to recognize race discrimination under Batson in the extraordinary circumstances of this death penalty case?2015
16LOCKHART v. UNITED STATES14-83582015-05-26Section 2252(b)(2) of title 18, U.S. C., requires a district court to impose a prison term of at least ten years on a defendant convicted of possessing child pornography if he "has a prior conviction ... under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward." The question presented is whether Section 2252(b)(2)'s mandatory minimum sentence is triggered by a prior conviction under a state law relating to "aggravated sexual abuse" or "sexual abuse," even though the conviction did not "involv[e] a minor or ward," an issue that divides the federal courts of appeals.2015
17CAMPBELL-EWALD COMPANY v. GOMEZ14-8572015-05-181. Whether a case becomes moot, and thus beyond the judicial power of Article III, when the plaintiff receives an offer of complete relief on his claim. 2. Whether the answer to the first question is any different when the plaintiff has asserted a class claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, but receives an offer of complete relief before any class is certified. 3. Whether the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity recognized in Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940), for government contractors is restricted to claims arising out of property damage caused by public works projects.2015
18Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply Association14-8402015-05-04Whether the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission reasonably concluded that it has authority under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 791a et seq., to regulate the rules used by operators of wholesale--electricity markets to pay for reductions in electricity consumption and to recoup those payments through adjustments to wholesale rates.2015
19ENERNOC, INC. v. ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY ASSOCIATION14-8412015-05-04Whether the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's jurisdiction over interstate markets for wholesale sales of electric energy under sections 201, 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. $$ 824(b)(1), 824d and 824e, provides the Commission with authority to regulate participation in those markets by demand response resources?2015
20SPOKEO, INC v. ROBINS13-13392015-04-27Whether Congress may confer Article III standing upon a plaintiff who suffers no concrete harm, and who therefore could not otherwise invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, by authorizing a private right of action based on a bare violation of a federal statute.2015
21GREEN v. DONAHOE14-6132015-04-27Under federal employment discrimination law, does the filing period for a constructive discharge claim begin to run when an employee resigns, as five circuits have held, or at the time of an employer's last allegedly discriminatory act giving rise to the resignation, as three other circuits have held?2015
22Kansas v. Jonathan Carr14-4492015-03-301. Whether the Eighth Amendment requires that a capital-sentencing jury be affirmatively instructed that mitigating circumstances "need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt," as the Kansas Supreme Court held here, or instead whether the Eighth Amendment is satisfied by instructions that, in context, make clear that each juror must individually assess and weigh any mitigating circumstances? 2. Whether the Confrontation Clause, as interpreted in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), applies to the "selection" phase of capital sentencing proceedings, as the Kansas Supreme Court held here, i.e., after a defendant has been convicted of capital murder and proof of eligibility for the death penalty has been presented in the guilt phase subject to full confrontation, or does not apply to such purely sentencing evidence, as at least three Circuits have held? 3. Whether the trial court's decision not to sever the sentencing phase of the co-defendant brothers' trial here-a decision that comports with the traditional approach preferring joinder in circumstances like this-violated an Eighth Amendment right to an "individualized sentencing" determination and was not harmless in any event?2015
23KANSAS v. CARR14-4502015-03-301. Whether the Eighth Amendment requires that a capital-sentencing jury be affirmatively instructed that mitigating circumstances "need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt," as the Kansas Supreme Court held here, or instead whether the Eighth Amendment is satisfied by instructions that, in context, make clear that each juror must individually assess and weigh any mitigating circumstances? 2. Whether the Confrontation Clause, as interpreted in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), applies to the "selection" phase of capital sentencing proceedings, as the Kansas Supreme Court held here, i.e., after a defendant has been convicted of capital murder and proof of eligibility for the death penalty has been presented in the guilt phase subject to full confrontation, or does not apply to such purely sentencing evidence, as at least three Circuits have held? 3. Whether the trial court's decision not to sever the sentencing phase of the co-defendant brothers' trial here-a decision that comports with the traditional approach preferring joinder in circumstances like this-violated an Eighth Amendment right to an "individualized sentencing" determination and was not harmless in any event?2015
24KANSAS v. GLEASON14-4522015-03-301. Whether the Eighth Amendment requires that a capital-sentencing jury be affirmatively instructed that mitigating circumstances "need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt," as the Kansas Supreme Court held in this case, or instead whether the Eighth Amendment is satisfied by instructions that, in context, make clear that each juror must individually assess and weigh any mitigating circumstances?2015
25Montanile v. Board of Trustees of the National Elevator Industry Health Benefit Plan14-7232015-03-30This petition presents a single question about the meaning of an important remedial provision of the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). Eight of the thirteen circuits have squarely and openly disagreed over the question presented. The result is a widely acknowledged 6-2 circuit split. In a recent invitation brief, the United States acknowledged the (then) 5-2 circuit split and endorsed the minority position. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Thurber v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 134 S.Ct. 2723 (May 6, 2014) (No. 13-130). The government recommended denial, however, solely on vehicle grounds. Id. at 15-20. The petition was denied. The question presented by this petition is: Does a lawsuit by an ERISA fiduciary against a participant to recover an alleged overpayment by the plan seek "equitable relief" within the meaning of ERISA section 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. $ 1132(a)(3), if the fiduciary has not identified a particular fund that is in the participant's possession and control at the time the fiduciary asserts its claim?2015
26MONTGOMERY v. LOUISIANA14-2802015-03-23Henry Montgomery has been incarcerated since 1963. Montgomery is serving a mandatory life sentence for a murder he committed just 11 days after he turned seventeen years of age. In light of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. _, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 83 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), which holds that mandatory sentencing schemes "requiring that all children convicted of homicide receive lifetime incarceration without possibility of parole" ... violate the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment, Montgomery filed a state district court motion to correct his illegal sentence. The trial court denied Montgomery's motion, and on direct writ application, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied Montgomery's application, citing State v. Tate, 2012--2763 (La. 11/5/13), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 2663, 189 L.Ed.2d 214 (2014), which held that Miller is not retroactive on collateral review to those incarcerated in Louisiana. The question thus presented here is whether Miller adopts a new substantive rule that applies retroactively on collateral review to people condemned as juveniles to die in prison? 2015
27DIRECTV, INC. v. IMBURGIA14-4622015-03-23Whether the California Court of Appeal erred by holding, in direct conflict with the Ninth Circuit, that a reference to state law in an arbitration agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration Act requires the application of state law preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. 2015
28HURST v. FLORIDA14-75052015-03-09 WHETHER THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE JURY IN A DEATH PENALTY CASE DOES NOT HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION TO RENDER A VERDICT IN THE PENALTY PHASE OF WHETHER THE DEFENDANT IS MENTALLY RETARDED OR NOT WHEN EVIDENCE HAS BEEN PRESENTED TO SUPPORT SUCH A CONCLUSION. WHETHER THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA HAS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN RING v. ARIZONA, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (1) HAS NO APPLICABILITY TO THE FLORIDA DEATH SENTENCING SCHEME GENERALLY, (2)THAT SPECIFICALLY IT DOES NOT REQUIRE THE JURY'S RECOMMENDATION OF DEATH BE UNANIMOUS, (3) THAT THE JURY FINDING OF AGGRAVATING FACTORS NEED NOT BE UNANIMOUS, (4) THAT THE JURY HAS NO ROLE IN DETERMINING THE FACTUAL ISSUE OF THE DEFENDANT MENTAL RETARDATION, AND (5) THAT THE LACK OF UNANIMITY DOES NOT OFFEND OUR EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY AS REQUIRED BY THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT? 2015
29OCASIO v. UNITED STATES14-3612015-03-02The Hobbs Act defines extortion, in relevant part, as "the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, ... under color of official right." 18 U.S.C. $ 1951(b)(2). This Court has held that a public official violates that statute when he "obtain[s] a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts." Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992). The question presented, on which the Fourth and Sixth Circuits explicitly disagree, is: Does a conspiracy to commit extortion require that the conspirators agree to obtain property from someone outside the conspiracy? 2015
30HAWKINS v. COMMUNITY BANK OF RAYMORE14-5202015-03-021. Are "primarily and unconditionally liable" spousal guarantors unambiguously excluded from being ECOA "applicants" because they are not integrally part of "any aspect of a credit transaction"? 2. Did the Federal Reserve Board have authority under the ECOA to include by regulation spousal guarantors as "applicants" to further the purposes of eliminating discrimination against married women? 2015
31OBB PERSONENVERKEHR AG v. SACHS13-10672015-01-231. Whether, for purposes of determining when an entity is an "agent" of a "foreign state" under the first clause of the commercial activity exception of the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a) (2), the express definition of "agency" in the FSIA, the factors set forth in First National City Bank v. Banco para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Bancec), 462 U.S. 611 (1983), or common law principles of agency, control. 2. Whether, under the first clause of the commercial activity exception of the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(2), a tort claim for personal injuries suffered in connection with travel outside of the United States is "based upon" the allegedly tortious conduct occurring outside of the United States or the preceding sale of the ticket in the United States for the travel entirely outside the United States. 2015
32Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission14-2320000-00-001. Does the desire to gain partisan advantage for one political party justify intentionally creating over-populated legislative districts that result in tens of thousands of individual voters being denied Equal Protection because their individual votes are devalued, violating the one-person, one-vote principle? 2. Does the desire to obtain favorable preclearance review by the Justice Department permit the creation of legislative districts that deviate from the one-person, one-vote principle? And, even if creating unequal districts to obtain preclearance approval was once justified, is this still a legitimate justification after Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013)? 3. Was the Arizona redistricting commission correct to disregard the majority--minority rule and rely on race and political party affiliation to create Hispanic "influence" districts?2015
33EVENWEL v. ABBOTT14-9400000-00-00In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), this Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes a "one-person, one-vote" principle. This principle requires that, "when members of an elected body are chosen from separate districts, each district must be established on a basis that will insure, as far as is practicable, that equal numbers of voters can vote for proportionally equal numbers of officials." Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist. Of Metro. Kansas City, Mo., 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970). In 2013, the Texas Legislature enacted a State Senate map creating districts that, while roughly equal in terms of total population, grossly malapportioned voters. Appellants, who live in Senate districts significantly overpopulated with voters, brought a one-person, one--vote challenge, which the three-judge district court below dismissed for failure to state a claim. The district court held that Appellants' constitutional challenge is a judicially unreviewable political question. The question presented is whether the "one-person, one-vote" principle of the Fourteenth Amendment creates a judicially enforceable right ensuring that the districting process does not deny voters an equal vote.2015
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