|1||GREEN v. DONAHOE||14-613||2015-11-30||Under federal employment discrimination law, does the filing period for a constructive discharge claim begin to run when an employee resigns, as five circuits have held, or at the time of an employer's last allegedly discriminatory act giving rise to the resignation, as three other circuits have held?|
|2||MUSACCHIO v. UNITED STATES||14-1095||2015-11-30||1. Whether the law-of-the-case doctrine requires the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case to be measured against the elements described in the jury instructions where those instructions, without objection, require the government to prove additional or more stringent elements than do the statute and indictment?
2. Whether a statute-of-limitations defense not raised at or before trial is reviewable on appeal?|
|3||Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States||14-510||2015-12-01||Whether the D.C. Circuit misapplied this Court's Holland decision when it ruled - in direct conflict with a holding of the Federal Circuit on materially similar facts - that the Tribe did not face an "extraordinary circumstance" warranting equitable tolling of the statute of limitations for filing of Indian Self-Determination Act claims under the Contract Disputes Act?|
|4||MERRILL LYNCH v. MANNING||14-1132||2015-12-01||Whether Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 provides federal jurisdiction over state-Iaw claims seeking to establish liability based on violations of the Act or its regulations or seeking to enforce duties created by the Act or its regulations.|
|5||GOBEILLE v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE||14-181||2015-12-02||Did the Second Circuit - in a 2-1 panel decision that disregarded the considered opinion advanced by the United States as amicus -err in holding that ERISA preempts Vermont's health care database law as applied to the third-party administrator for a self-funded ERISA plan?|
|6||Dollar General Corporation v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians||13-1496||2015-12-07||Whether Indian tribal courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate civil tort claims against nonmembers, including as a means of regulating the conduct of nonmembers who enter into consensual relationships with a tribe or its members?|
|7||Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission||14-232||2015-12-08||1. Does the desire to gain partisan advantage for one political party justify intentionally creating over-populated legislative districts that result in tens of thousands of individual voters being denied Equal Protection because their individual votes are devalued, violating the one-person, one-vote principle?
2. Does the desire to obtain favorable preclearance review by the Justice Department permit the creation of legislative districts that deviate from the one-person, one-vote principle? And, even if creating unequal districts to obtain preclearance approval was once justified, is this still a legitimate justification after Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013)?
3. Was the Arizona redistricting commission correct to disregard the majority--minority rule and rely on race and political party affiliation to create Hispanic "influence" districts?|
|8||EVENWEL v. ABBOTT||14-940||2015-12-08||In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), this Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes a "one-person, one-vote" principle. This principle requires that, "when members of an elected body are chosen from separate districts, each district must be established on a basis that will insure, as far as is practicable, that equal numbers of voters can vote for proportionally equal numbers of officials." Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist. Of Metro. Kansas City, Mo., 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970). In 2013, the Texas Legislature enacted a State Senate map creating districts that, while roughly equal in terms of total population, grossly malapportioned voters. Appellants, who live in Senate districts significantly overpopulated with voters, brought a one-person, one--vote challenge, which the three-judge district court below dismissed for failure to state a claim. The district court held that Appellants' constitutional challenge is a judicially unreviewable political question. The question presented is whether the "one-person, one-vote" principle of the Fourteenth Amendment creates a judicially enforceable right ensuring that the districting process does not deny voters an equal vote.|
|9||FISHER v. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN||14-981||2015-12-09||Whether the Fifth Circuit's re-endorsement of the University of Texas at Austin's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions decisions can be sustained under this Court's decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, including Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).|